Do Voters Respond to Cross-Cleavage Campaigning in Polarized Societies?

Leonardo R. Arriola, UC Berkeley[1*]

Donghyun Danny Choi, Brown University[2*]

Matthew K. Gichohi, Chr. Michelsen Institute[3*]

Ken Ochieng' Opalo, Georgetown University[4*]

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Abstract

Are cross-cleavage campaigns effective in polarized societies? While social demographics and electoral rules in many countries compel candidates to pursue votes outside their own identity groups, the efficacy of such campaigns remains unclear in polarized contexts. We argue that cross-cleavage electoral outreach through in-person campaign rallies can inadvertently trigger inter-group differentiation and competition, resulting in the heightened salience of identity and depressed voter support for outgroup candidates. We assess these claims by exploiting the timing of an unscheduled campaign rally held by an outgroup presidential candidate in another ethnic group's stronghold during Kenya's 2017 election. Comparing survey respondents before and after the rally, we find that the outgroup candidate's post-rally favorability significantly decreased among ingroup voters, while the proportion of voters identifying in ethnic terms simultaneously increased. These findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the challenges faced in democratic elections in socially divided societies.

Keywords: Campaign effects, rallies, ethnic politics, social identity theory, Kenya

1 Introduction

Since the survival of democracy in polarized societies is thought to depend on identity-based inclusion, candidates are typically encouraged to seek votes beyond their respective social groups (Lijphart, 1977; Reynolds, 2011). Nearly two-thirds of countries have adopted statutory incentives to encourage candidates to campaign among a broad range of identity groups (Reilly, 2006; Bogaards, 2010; Bormann and Golder, 2013). Yet, there is little systematic understanding of how voters actually respond to candidates who make cross-cleavage appeals in polarized societies. Do such appeals work?

This paper focuses on the cross-cleavage appeals delivered by candidates through campaign rallies. In countries across Africa (Paget, 2019), Asia (Chua, 2007), and Latin America (Szwarcberg, 2014), candidates rely on rallies to connect with voters in person because "nothing has replaced the attraction of the mass rally or the razzmatazz of the candidates' visits to villages or populous neighborhoods" (Espíndola, 2002, p.74).[1] Such rallies enable candidates to speak directly with voters through speeches touting past accomplishments as well as promised future actions. Especially where clientelistic politics endure, candidates use rallies to signal their willingness to act as patrons by distributing handouts, including money, food, and other gifts, to those in attendance (Nugent, 2007; Kramon, 2016). Rallies thus serve as sites of political communication where candidates attempt to persuade voters that they will faithfully represent their interests in government.

We argue that campaign appeals by outgroup candidates can actually reify ingroup voters' perceptions of intergroup difference. Drawing on the scholarship on social identity (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987) and identity heuristics (Ferree, 2010; Adida et al., 2017), we claim that the very features of campaigning that candidates employ to win votes – presenting themselves in person at rallies that attract thousands of people – can instead induce voters to react defensively when already primed to interpret political events through the lens of identity. Outgroup candidates who hold rallies in the constituencies of other groups can inadvertently stimulate group identification among local voters and depress their electoral support as a result.

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[1]Nearly 40 percent of respondents across 32 African countries reported having attended a rally in a previous election. See Afrobarometer, Round 7.

We assess the effects of cross-cleavage campaigning by leveraging an unexpected event during survey design around the timing of a campaign rally held during Kenya's 2017 election. We analyze the impact of an unscheduled rally held for Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo presidential candidate, on voters' attitudes in Uasin Gishu County, a large electoral unit with a population of more than 1.1 million where ethnic Kalenjins constitute a majority. This rally was Odinga's attempt to reach out to non-coethnic voters in the home county of William Ruto, the Kalenjin running mate of Uhuru Kenyatta, the incumbent president.

The timing of Odinga's rally was independent of a locally representative survey being conducted in Uasin Gishu, providing a source of exogenous variation in voters' exposure to an outgroup candidate. We estimate the effect of the rally on voters' evaluations of the two presidential candidates by comparing survey respondents interviewed prior to the rally (the control group) to those interviewed after the rally (the treatment group). We show that the rally failed to persuade voters to support the outgroup candidate: the rally significantly reduced the outgroup candidate's approval ratings (between 8–10 points), while increasing ratings for the candidate allied to their ingroup representative (5–8 points). Further analysis suggests that the mechanism underpinning these results is a heightened salience of ethnicity triggered among local voters following the rally.

The paper's findings contribute to ongoing research on electoral campaigns in diverse and polarized societies (Lindberg and Weghorst, 2013; Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Koter, 2013; Horowitz, 2017; Gadjanova, 2021). We document how an outgroup candidate's discrete attempt to cross an identity-based cleavage abruptly increased the salience of ethnicity. Voters appear to have evaluated the outgroup candidate on ethnic terms despite his efforts to appeal to them through valence issues such as the economy.[2] These findings are unlikely to be an artefact of greater ethnic salience around elections (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010), since the rally in our study site occurred only two weeks before the election. Moreover, our findings signal the potential limits of institutional design in discouraging identity-based political mobilization. Regardless of the institutional incentives faced by candidates, we demonstrate that the attitudinal and behavioral effects of cross-cleavage appeals are conditioned

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[2]The full transcript of the rally is available in the online appendix.

by cognitive processes influencing how voters perceive candidates' identities.

2 Cross-Cleavage Campaigning through Rallies

Campaign rallies pose a special challenge for candidates in societies divided by polarized social cleavages, whether ethnic, linguistic, or religious. Insights from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) and the scholarship on identity heuristics (Ferree, 2010; Adida et al., 2017) suggest that voters polarized along identity lines may become resistant to appeals that outgroup candidates deliver through rallies. A candidate's own social identity is part of the campaign message because voters are primed to interpret electoral events and outcomes in group-based terms. Particularly in countries with fractious identity-based politics, candidates invest considerable effort in defining their opponents by their identities, questioning their ability to represent voters outside group boundaries. This framing strategy helps to neutralize cross-cleavage campaigns by making candidates' promises to attend to the interests of outgroup voters seem implausible (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005). Under such conditions, the message a candidate intends to convey is as likely to be interpreted as a political threat by some voters as it is to be seen as a simple appeal by others.

We argue that campaign rallies by outgroup candidates can inadvertently backfire among ingroup voters by reifying perceived identity-based differences. Voters who value their membership in a group, such as an ethnicity, race, or religion, are induced to act defensively when political events – like rallies – make inter-group differences salient (Fiske and Pavelchak, 1985; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). We contend that such a reaction can be stimulated among ingroup voters by the essential features of an outgroup candidate's rally. First, the *physical presence* of the outgroup candidate in an ingroup constituency triggers a sense of intergroup threat. Second, the *mass attendance* at the outgroup candidate's rally amplifies the sense of threat.

2.1 Physical Presence at a Rally

A constituency's demographics condition how a candidate's presence at a rally is perceived by voters. Because identity groups are often geographically concentrated and residentially segregated in polarized societies (Kasara, 2013), the members of those groups tend to develop a shared political outlook in which people believe that their individual fate is intertwined with their group's political status (Dawson, 1994). Electoral periods are then understood as moments of risk for the group as a whole: an ingroup candidate's win might ensure the future flow of political benefits, whereas an outgroup candidate's win might jeopardize those benefits (Edjemyr, Kramon and Robinson, 2017). Voters primed to think in such terms are likely to be wary of the visit to their constituency by an outgroup candidate.

The outgroup candidate's presence at the rally heightens group identification among ingroup voters because they are reminded that the candidate's victory could be detrimental to their own interests (Schmid and Muldoon, 2015; Feinberg, Branton and Martinez-Ebers, 2022). In this respect, a rally's effects do not depend on what a candidate says or does. Rather, as an outsider to the ingroup constituency, the outgroup candidate's physical presence at a rally sets in motion the cognitive processes of identification and discrimination among ingroup voters (Petrow, 2010; McConnaughy et al., 2010). The candidate's presence cues ingroup voters to actively consider whether their political status will be diminished by the successful mobilization behind an outgroup's candidate.

By showcasing an outgroup candidate, a rally triggers a sense of threat based on physical proximity among ingroup voters. Related research in social psychology shows that, especially when affective or collective identity is salient, physical proximity increases perceptions of threat. Individuals seen as threatening are often misperceived as being physically closer than in reality and elicit more discriminatory intergroup attitudes (Xiao and Van Bavel, 2012; Cole, Balcetis and Dunning, 2013). This form of misperception is likely an adaptive fight or flight response enabling individuals to be more vigilant in avoiding costly mistakes that threaten their group's status or safety (Simon, 2008; Wohl, Branscombe and Reysen, 2010). Among ingroup members, the appearance of an outgroup candidate within their constituency could therefore be received with apprehension rather than appreciation.

2.2   Mass Attendance at the Rally

The sense of threat that an outgroup candidate's rally engenders is exacerbated by the number of people it attracts in a polarized context. In assembling hundreds, if not thousands, around the outgroup candidate, a rally can be seen as a physical incursion by an outgroup's candidate with the intent to divide the ingroup. In this way, the outgroup candidate's rally represents more than a symbolic threat to the political status of the ingroup; it also constitutes an immediate threat to the ingroup's political unity. Such perceptions can lead voters to reaffirm their support for ingroup candidates as a means of offsetting the electoral threat represented by the outgroup candidate (Piston, 2010; Highton, 2011).

The perceived threat associated with an outgroup candidate's rally stems, in part, from the attendance by ingroup members. If attendance at such a rally is understood to be a violation of group loyalty in a polarized context, ingroup members can respond by reaffirming the group's identity norms (Benard, 2012) as well as demonstrating intolerance of ingroup defectors (Penic, Elcheroth and Reicher, 2016). Ingroup critics who publicly support an outgroup candidate might be perceived as having ulterior motives inconsistent with ingroup interests (Adelman and Dasgupta, 2019). Given such dynamics, ingroup members are likely to react to an outgroup candidate's rally by expressing greater resolve to support an ingroup alternative.

The logic outlined here leads to two observable expectations regarding how rallies condition the relationship between outgroup candidates and ingroup voters in polarized societies. First, rallies by outgroup candidates in constituencies populated by ingroup voters should weaken their local electoral support. Second, as evidence of the cognitive processes outlined above, an outgroup candidate's rally should lead to an increase in the salience of social identity among ingroup voters.

3   Empirical Context

We assess voters' responses to cross-cleavage campaigning in Kenya, where politicized ethnicity has deep historical roots (Ajulu, 2002; Lynch, 2011). The centrality of ethnicity to electoral mobilization became evident soon after the reintroduction of multipartyism. Fearing the electoral threat posed by

politicians from other ethnic groups, President Daniel arap Moi designated constituencies inhabited by his coethnics and allied ethnic groups as ruling party zones in the 1992 and 1997 elections. Candidates from outgroups were called "enemy" or "foreigner" in such zones (Osamba, 2001), and often forcibly prevented from campaigning (Hassan, 2016). The high stakes associated with such ethnicized competition resulted in periodic violent conflict through subsequent elections (Kasara, 2017; Klaus, 2017).

While Kenya's ethnic demographics and electoral rules compel politicians to form cross-ethnic alliances in order to win national elections (Lynch, 2014; Cheeseman and Larmer, 2015; Gadjanova, 2021), these alliances tend to be short-lived among politicians widely perceived as representatives of their respective ethnic groups.[3] For example, Kikuyu and Luo politicians were part of the same alliance in the 2002 presidential election, but Luo politicians allied with Kalenjin politicians against a Kikuyu incumbent president in 2007. In both 2013 and 2017, a Kalenjin-Kikuyu alliance beat a Luo-Kamba alliance. The fluidity of these alliances – and their associated realignment of ethnically-defined voting blocs – reflects the ability of Kenyan politicians to mobilize voters on the basis of coethnicity. Once voters from an ethnic group see their leading politicians in a particular alliance, they will tend to vote for that alliance en masse.

The 2013 and 2017 elections featured competitive races between the same set of presidential tickets: Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) as presidential candidate and William Ruto (Kalenjin) as his deputy president versus Raila Odinga (Luo) and Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba) as his running mate. Kenyatta and Ruto headed the Jubilee ticket in both elections, while Odinga and Kalonzo headed the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) in 2013 and then the National Super Alliance (NASA) in 2017.[4] Therefore, when our study was conducted in 2017, the electoral alliances had recognized ethnic bases.

In the 2017 election, the major coalitions campaigned across the country to meet the constitution's majoritarian (50 percent plus one) and distributional thresholds (25 percent in at least 24 counties). Our study site, Uasin Gishu County, was considered part of Kenyatta's base as the home county of Ruto,

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[3]The 2010 constitution requires winning candidates to win a majority of votes cast and at least one quarter of votes in 24 of 47 counties. Otherwise, the top two candidates enter a second-round runoff.

[4]CORD split ahead of the 2017 election, resulting in the creation of the NASA coalition.

his running mate, and Ruto's coethnic Kalenjin. However, Odinga had an incentive to campaign there because its local demographic mix meant he might reach the constitutional vote threshold requirement. Since Odinga won 21.3% of the vote in Uasin Gishu in the 2013 election, holding a rally there could bump his vote share up to the 25% threshold.[5] Odinga's rally was understood as a bid to move into "Deputy President William Ruto's Uasin Gishu backyard."[6]

Odinga's rally on 26 July 2017 attracted considerable local attention because it was held in Uasin Gishu's capital and largest city, Eldoret.[7] The rally was structured to emphasize Odinga's local as well as national support with a series of speakers addressing the rally over two and a half hours. The speech delivered by Odinga focused on valence issues such as development, governance, and corruption. Odinga also sought to convince rally attendees that he would improve their economic conditions, bring down the cost of living, and expand opportunities for youth. Odinga, however, never made reference to ethnicity. Ultimately, this instance of cross-cleavage outreach failed: Odinga received 21.2% of the county vote to Kenyatta's 78.2%.[8]

We can identify the impact of Odinga's rally on voters within Uasin Gishu due to a fortuitous set of circumstances. Between 18 July 2017 and 1 August 2017, we conducted a locally representative field survey for an unrelated study. Odinga's unscheduled rally occurred approximately halfway through this field survey, allowing us to compare the favorability ratings of both presidential candidates among registered voters before and after the rally. The rally's exogenous timing, relative to the survey's administration, serves as a natural source of variation in voter exposure to the rally. The rally had been canceled twice due to the sudden deaths of prominent Kalenjin politicians Nicholas Biwott and Bethwell Kiplagat.[9] Odinga's rescheduled rally on 26 July 2017 was therefore unanticipated by Uasin Gishu's voters because it was organized only at the last minute.

Trends subsequent to Odinga's rally unlikely to be due to counter-mobilization efforts by the

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[5]Stephen Rutto, "Raila Woos Ruto's North Rift Backyard, Says Maize Shortage Shows Jubilee Failure," *The Star*, 26 July 2017.

[6]Wycliffe Kipsang and Philemon Suter, "Raila Odinga Camps in William Ruto's Uasin Gishu Backyard," *Daily Nation*, 26 July 2017.

[7]See here: `https://vimeo.com/231680307`

[8]Republic of Kenya, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

[9]"NASA cancels Rift Valley rallies to mourn Biwott, Bethuel Kiplagat," *The Star*, 21 July 2017.

Kenyatta-Ruto campaign. Our survey protocol required enumerators to report on all political and campaign activities occurring within their designated enumeration areas. Indeed, this is how we were alerted to the unanticipated occurrence of the Odinga campaign rally. Yet, in the following weeks, no enumerator reported any unusual or stepped-up campaign activity by the incumbent party. Furthermore, Odinga's rally did not coincide with any local or national political events that would have affected his evaluations among only a subset of voters. In the following section, we describe additional steps taken to corroborate this claim.

Table 1: Rallies held during campaigns for 2017 Kenyan Presidential Election, June–August

| | Classification of Rally Location | | | |
	Incumbent Stronghold	Opposition Stronghold	Competitive Area	Total
Party Holding the Rally				
Jubilee (Incumbent) Party	5 (56%)	3 (33%)	1 (11%)	9 (100%)
NASA (Opposition) Coalition	5 (24%)	4 (19%)	16 (76%)	25 (100%)
Total	10	7	17	34

Notes: Author collected data on mass rallies held by the incumbent and opposition party attended by the presidential and vice presidential candidate between June 3rd–August 5th, 2017. Classification of rally locations is based on whether either the presidential and deputy presidential candidates for each party were from the majority ethnic group of the county in which the rally was held.

The implications of our findings travel beyond our study site. Kenyan presidential candidates have strong demographic and statutory incentives to reach out across ethnic group boundaries, which is corroborated by systematic data on the location of party rallies during the three-month run-up to the 2017 presidential election. As reported in Table 1, while the incumbent Jubilee party spent a majority of their time campaigning in their own strongholds, a full 33% of their rallies were held in the opposition's strongholds. Although the opposition NASA coalition seemed to have focused their mobilization efforts predominantly in competitive or "swing" areas, close to a quarter of their rallies were conducted in counties that are classified as Jubilee party strongholds. These figures bolster confidence that the inferences drawn in this paper are not a unique feature of a single rally, but a dynamic we are likely to observe across a broader class of rallies as candidates make forays into their

opponent's "home turf."[10]

Our contribution here is noteworthy in that we identify the effect of a campaign rally on identity-driven political behavior under conditions of already elevated ethnic salience. The day of Odinga's rally, 26 July 2017, was *several months* into the campaign period and a mere fortnight before the election. What we document is an *abrupt* change in the salience of ethnicity and concomitant shifts in the evaluations of candidates following a campaign rally. This mechanism is independent of whether or not voters in a constituency attended the rally in person. Instead, what drives voters' reactions is knowing about the occurrence of the rally – the very fact that an outgroup candidate sought to mobilize support within their constituency. [11] We should expect stronger reactions to Odinga's rally among respondents who had direct information about the rally.

4   Research Design

4.1   Empirical Strategy

Capturing the effect of campaigns on voters remains one of the most "perplexing problems" in political science (Druckman, 2004). Cognizant of the methodological challenges in assessing how exposure to campaigns shape voters' reactions (Gerber, Green and Kaplan, 2014), we attempt to identify the effect of a real-world campaign on voters' evaluations of presidential candidates by leveraging an Unexpected Event During Survey Design (UESD) (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020). As noted in the previous section, we exploit the fieldwork schedule for a locally representative survey that straddled an unscheduled campaign rally in Uasin Gishu County during the 2017 election.[12] The

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[10]We classified rally locations based on whether either the presidential and vice-presidential candidates for each party were from the majority ethnic group of the county in which the rally was held. Competitive, or "swing" areas are counties whose majority ethnic group is not represented in the presidential ticket for either of the two parties.

[11]This observation does not preclude the fact that media markets and social networks that propagate our mechanism are often spatially-concentrated.

[12]Our claim that the rally was unexpectedly cancelled and rescheduled is corroborated by data on web searches. Figure 5 below plots the count of Google and Youtube searches within Kenya for the term "NASA Eldoret." The figure reveals large spikes in both searches on the date of the rescheduled rally (26 July) and the day after (27 July) with a smaller number of searches on the originally scheduled date (21 July). Importantly, there is no discernible increase in search trends in the days leading up to the rescheduled rally. Finally, the outcomes of interest in this paper were measured prior to the administration of the experimental treatments in our original study.

timeline of events around the survey is presented in Figure 1. Since the field schedule of the survey was determined independent of the rally, the rally's timing relative to the administration of the survey produces a natural source of exogenous variation in voter exposure to a campaign event.

Figure 1: Timeline of Events

Survey respondents interviewed within a certain time interval *prior* to the rally are considered the control group, while those interviewed *after* the event are designated as the treatment group. The assumptions and conditions under which valid inferences can be drawn from this design has recently been systematized by Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2020). We address potential threats to inference concretely in Section 6 below. Empirical studies that adopt a similar research design include Van der Brug (2001), Legewie (2013), and Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa (2018).[13]

We estimate the effect of the rally on respondents' evaluations of the main presidential candidates in Kenya's 2017 election – Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. While it would have been preferable to use reported vote intention as the main outcome variable, our survey did not include such a question prior to the rally's occurrence. Instead, we use a feeling thermometer question that was consistently asked before and after the rally. The feeling thermometer has been frequently used as a composite measure for candidate evaluations (e.g., Ladd and Lenz (2008)). The average treatment effect of the rally can be estimated with reg ression models and a dichotomous variable for the treatment status:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{PostRally}_i + \beta_2 X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

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[13]A detailed description of the survey's fieldwork methodology is in SI Appendix Section B. The survey was administered in manner that mitigates concerns over observed and unobserved differences in the composition of the pre- and post-rally samples, which could compromise the validity of this research design. Section 6 of the paper provides a discussion of how we address the potential inferential threats to this design.

where Y_i is the feeling thermometer rating for each candidate, $\texttt{PostRally}_i$ is an indicator that takes on the value of 0 if the respondent was interviewed before the rally and 1 if she was interviewed after, X_i is a vector of pretreatment covariates for individual respondents that includes age, prior turnout, level of education, religious identification, and an index of asset ownership.[14] The parameter of interest, β_1, provides the effect of the rally on presidential candidate evaluations.[15]

In the following analyses, we make pre- and post-rally comparisons using different bandwidths around the day of Odinga's rally in accordance with a widely accepted analytic approach to natural experiments (Bueno and Dunning, 2017; Legewie, 2013; Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018). Since we have information on the exact time and location of the rally, combined with the precise time stamps for each survey, we choose to keep surveys collected during the day of the rally, since all were completed before the rally was held. It is important to highlight that the identification strategy we employ does not afford us with an exogenous source of variation on rally attendance. What we are able to estimate using our empirical strategy is the effect of a candidate's rally on average local public opinion, which includes individuals who attended the rally themselves, those who had knowledge that the rally occurred in their locality, as well as those who did not.

4.2   Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the survey sample on key covariates that enter our regression equations and inform the subsequent empirical analyses. By design, the survey is almost exactly balanced on gender. The mean age of the sample is at 32.6 years. As expected of a county in Kenya's upper Rift Valley, Kalenjins, the coethnics of Kenyatta's running-mate, Ruto, are the largest ethnic group represented in the survey with 65% of respondents. Kikuyus, Kenyatta's coethnics, constitute 10%. Together, these two incumbent-aligned ethnic groups comprise 75% of the population. Luos, Odinga's own coethics, constitute 5% of the sample, while Luhyas represent 15% of the sample.

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[14]The asset ownership index is the mean of five dichotomous variables denoting ownership of a motor vehicle, a mobile phone, a radio, a television, and a bicycle.

[15]To rule out the possibility that other events around the time of the rally are driving our results, we conducted a thorough examination of news outlets within the time period in question, but did not find noteworthy events that could potentially impact voter assessments of the candidates. We reviewed the `Daily Nation`, `The Star`, `The Standard`,

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of county survey sample

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Demographics					
Gender	1,361	0.49	0.50	0	1
Age	1,358	32.62	10.71	18	81
Voted in 2013	1,359	0.66	0.47	0	1
Voted Uhuru 2013	1361	0.54	0.50	0	1
Voted Raila 2013	1361	0.09	0.28	0	1
Secondary Education	1,360	0.79	0.41	0	1
Asset Index	1,360	0.62	0.24	0.00	2.40
Ethnicity and Religion					
Kalenjin	1,361	0.65	0.48	0	1
Kikuyu	1,361	0.10	0.30	0	1
Luo	1,361	0.04	0.19	0	1
Luhya	1,361	0.15	0.36	0	1
Protestant	1,359	0.67	0.47	0	1
Treatment and Outcomes					
Surveyed After Rally	1,361	0.31	0.46	0	1
Aware of Rally	425	0.82	0.38	0	1
Attended Rally	425	0.15	0.36	0	1
Acquaintance Attended Rally	425	0.31	0.46	0	1
Odinga Feeling Thermometer	1,356	42.11	29.85	0	100
Kenyatta Feeling Thermometer	1,357	77.80	24.36	0	100

Out of 1,361 respondents interviewed in the full survey, 31% or 425 were surveyed *after* the political rally. Among these 425 respondents, a high proportion (82%) report they had knowledge that Odinga's rally was held in Uasin Gishu on 26 July 2017, attesting to the high salience of the event.[16] In the post-rally sample, 15% of respondents report having attended the rally in person, while 31% report having a family, friend, or acquaintance who attended the rally.[17] Finally, the mean feeling thermometer responses for the two presidential candidates are in line with the fact that Uasin Gishu is considered a stronghold of the Kenyatta-Ruto presidential ticket: Kenyatta's mean in the entire sample is 77.80, while Odinga's mean is 42.11.

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and `AllAfrica.com` as well as the Youtube pages of `KTN News`, `NTV`, and `Citizen TV`.

[16]The breakdown of rally awareness and attendance by ethnic group and a regression-based analyses of the correlates of these variables are reported in Tables D1 and D2 in the SI Appendix. Using this information, we can estimate the impact of the rally on the subset of the survey sample with knowledge of the rally, or the complier average causal effect (CACE). Results are presented in Table 4.

[17]Rally awareness and attendance measures were added to the survey after enumerators reported that a rally was about to occur. These additional questions were included in the survey in time for commencement of data collection on Day 10.

4.3 Design Validation

We leverage the exogeneity of the timing of Odinga's rally vis-à-vis our locally representative survey to identify the impact of the campaign event on voters' evaluations of the two leading candidates. While it is implausible that the Odinga campaign coordinated their rally based on the timing of our survey, administered as a part of a different field experiment, we nevertheless examine whether there is any statistically significant imbalance between the control (pre-rally) and the treatment (post-rally) groups on key pre-treatment covariates. Importantly, the outcomes we use in this paper were measured prior to the experimental treatments administered as part of our original study. Table 3 shows the results of the balance tests.

The results of the balance tests between the pre- and post-rally samples increase our confidence that the empirical strategy can yield valid estimates for the rally's effects. In Table 3, we show the mean value of a battery of pretreatment covariates in the pre-rally and post-rally samples, the difference in the mean values between those two samples, and the p-value of the difference-in-means for the full sample, 5 day bandwidth, and 3 day bandwidth. There is little evidence of meaningful differences between the respondents surveyed before and after the rally. Pre- and post-rally samples are remarkably similar in terms of past electoral participation, age, secondary education, coethnicity with either Kenyatta (Kikuyu) or Ruto (Kalenjin), and asset ownership. The only apparent imbalance is in the proportion of respondents identifying as Protestants. The proportion of Protestants is 8 percentage points lower in the post-rally sample (64%) in comparison to the pre-rally sample (72%). However, in Kenyan politics, Christian denominational affiliation is not a politically-relevant category.

We also conduct F-tests of joint significance. The p-values for the F-tests consistently fail to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. While we generated these balance statistics using the three-day bandwidth sample, covariate balance remains substantively unchanged for other samples. Despite the lack of imbalance, we include these covariates in some of the regression specifications.

Table 3: Balance Statistics

A. Full Sample (N=1361)

	Pre-Rally	Post-Rally	Diff. Means	P-Value (T-Test)
Demographics				
Gender	0.465	0.517	0.052	0.077
Age	32.279	33.377	1.098	0.091
Prev. Turnout	0.665	0.647	-0.018	0.521
Voted Uhuru	0.533	0.557	0.024	0.418
Voted Raila	0.093	0.069	-0.024	0.117
Sec. Edu	0.792	0.818	0.026	0.274
Protestant	0.690	0.623	-0.067	0.018
Asset Index	0.616	0.622	0.006	0.689
Ethnicity				
Kalenjin	0.628	0.682	0.054	0.051
Kikuyu	0.104	0.133	0.029	0.136
Luo	0.043	0.026	-0.017	0.101
Luhya	0.165	0.116	-0.049	0.014
Kamba	0.010	0.009	-0.001	0.978
Other	0.050	0.033	-0.017	0.129

B. 5 Day Bandwidth Sample (N=886)

	Pre-Rally	Post-Rally	Diff. Means	P-Value (T-Test)
Demographics				
Gender	0.454	0.516	0.062	0.072
Age	32.175	33.219	1.044	0.161
Prev. Turnout	0.670	0.652	-0.018	0.581
Voted Uhuru	0.556	0.558	0.002	0.934
Voted Raila	0.077	0.071	-0.006	0.739
Sec. Edu	0.793	0.826	0.033	0.214
Protestant	0.718	0.630	-0.088	0.007
Asset Index	0.613	0.621	0.008	0.644
Ethnicity				
Kalenjin	0.676	0.695	0.019	0.550
Kikuyu	0.098	0.111	0.013	0.534
Luo	0.023	0.026	0.003	0.775
Luhya	0.149	0.122	-0.027	0.261
Kamba	0.006	0.009	0.003	0.624
Other	0.049	0.037	-0.012	0.387

C. 3 Day Bandwidth Sample (N=493)

	Pre-Rally	Post-Rally	Diff. Means	P-Value (T-Test)
Demographics				
Gender	0.469	0.523	0.054	0.235
Age	31.835	32.899	1.064	0.258
Prev. Turnout	0.685	0.693	0.008	0.855
Voted Uhuru	0.560	0.601	0.041	0.367
Voted Raila	0.099	0.064	-0.035	0.159
Sec. Edu	0.798	0.817	0.019	0.616
Protestant	0.722	0.642	-0.080	0.062
Asset Index	0.620	0.625	0.005	0.815
Ethnicity				
Kalenjin	0.630	0.679	0.049	0.258
Kikuyu	0.121	0.124	0.003	0.921
Luo	0.026	0.023	-0.003	0.847
Luhya	0.165	0.142	-0.023	0.489
Kamba	0.011	0.009	-0.002	0.841
Other	0.048	0.023	-0.025	0.134

5 Does Cross-Ethnic Campaigning Work?

5.1 The Rally's Effects on Candidate Support

Did the outgroup candidate's rally affect voter evaluations of presidential candidates? We first take a descriptive approach to the analysis by graphically presenting daily trends in the evaluations of the outgroup candidate (Odinga) versus ingroup candidate (Kenyatta) before and after the rally in Figure 2.[18] This descriptive approach will provide a preliminary but *intuitive* assessment of the idea that there should be discernible changes to the evaluation of ingroup and outgroup candidates induced by the rally. Points in blue and red represent in Figure 2 individual observations in the pre- and post-rally samples, while the blue and red lines are LOESS fits based on these raw data. The area shaded in gray on either side of the blue and red LOESS lines constitute the 95% confidence intervals.

The ten-point drop in Odinga's feeling thermometer after the rally is noticeable in subfigure (a). Conversely, the eight-point increase in Kenyatta's feeling thermometer ratings is clearly observed in the post-rally sample vis-à-vis the pre-rally sample. These effects do not appear to fade. Odinga's ratings never recover from the immediate post-rally drop, maintaining a mean of 35 throughout the remainder of the data collection period. Kenyatta's ratings also do not revert back to pre-rally levels, maintaining a mean of 83 until the last day of data collection and just seven days prior to the presidential election.

Applying the empirical approach outlined in our research design section, Figure 3 presents a coefficient plot that summarizes the main results of linear regressions with the raw feeling thermometer scores for Odinga, the outgroup candidate, and Kenyatta, the ingroup candidate, as outcome variables. The figure reports the average treatment effects estimated using the full sample of the survey as well as the five and three-day bandwidth sub-samples. We present results with and without a battery of respondent-level controls.

Consistent with our theoretical expectations, the results indicate that the rally did not produce its intended effects for the outgroup candidate. A comparison of the pre- and post-rally samples shows

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[18]These plots, while resembling graphical analyses of regression discontinuity designs (RDD), should not be interpreted to indicate that our analyses satisfy assumptions required for a RDD-based analysis.

Figure 2: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations, by day

(a) Ratings for Odinga (Outgroup Candidate)   (b) Ratings for Kenyatta (Ingroup Candidate)

Notes: Feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Points represent FT rating for each respondent with jittering to mitigate overlap. LOESS curves for the pre-rally and post-rally samples are presented in blue and red respectively, with 95 percent confidence intervals for each shaded in gray. The opposition rally was held on day 9 of the survey.

that the rally had a *negative* effect on respondent evaluations of Odinga. Across the range of samples and specifications with and without respondent-level controls—represented by the circle and square—there is nearly around a 10 point drop in Odinga's mean feeling thermometer ratings. These negative changes across model specifications are consistently statistically significant at p<0.01. By contrast, the rally benefited the ingroup candidate. Kenyatta's mean feeling thermometer ratings increased between 6 to 8 points according to the same model specifications.[19]

One concern regarding the findings' validity, given the nature of politics in Kenya, may arise from any imbalance in the proportion of ethnic groups represented in the pre- and post-rally respondent

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[19]These results can be considered intention-to-treat (ITT) effects: they include both people who had knowledge of the rally (for whom we expect the rally to have an effect) as well as those who did not (for whom the rally should not have an effect). Among respondents who learned of the rally, the effects increase in magnitude by around 20%. See Table 4 for a discussion of these complier average causal effects (CACE) analysis. The effect of the rally also had spillover effects on down-ballot races. Jackson Mandago, Uasin Gishu's incumbent governor who ran on Kenyatta's Jubilee party ticket, also benefited unexpectedly from the rally. Analysis of the rally's effects on Mandago's support is presented in SI Appendix Table H1.

Figure 3: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations

(a) FT Ratings for Odinga (Outgroup Candidate)   (b) FT Ratings for Kenyatta (Ingroup Candidate)

Notes: The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. The point estimates for the effect of the rally without controls, with respondent level controls, and with respondent level controls and ethnicity fixed effects are denoted by the circle, square, and triangle respectively. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.

pools. Depending on the bandwidth sample, the ethnic groups that align with Kenyatta (Kalenjin and Kikuyu) were around 3–5 percentage points more likely to be included in the post-rally sample than in the pre-rally sample.[20] To rule out the possibility that differences in sample composition are driving results, we also run analyses that include respondent ethnicity fixed effects (spanning 15 ethnic categories). The point estimate of the effects from these analyses is denoted as the red triangle in both subplots in Figure 3.

Even with the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects, the rally's negative impact on the outgroup candidate's feeling thermometer persists; the rally leads to a decrease in Odinga's ratings by around eight points. The rally's positive effect for Kenyatta's feeling thermometer (around five points) also retains statistical significance at $p < 0.01$. These results are further corroborated with analysis employing non-parametric matching methods (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013), where we match on all individual-

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[20]The imbalance reaches statistical significance at the P<0.1 level in the full sample, but do not reach statistical significance at the 5 day and 3 day bandwidth samples.

level covariates and match *exactly* on ethnic group membership and religion. These results are reported in Table H1 of the SI Appendix.

Table 4: Complier average causal effect of the rally

	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Raila Odinga		
	Full Sample	5 day bandwidth	3 day bandwidth
Post Rally	-12.73^{***}	-11.61^{***}	-11.34^{***}
	(2.13)	(2.57)	(3.32)
Constant	45.39	44.36	44.91
	(0.98)	(1.32)	(1.85)
Observations	1,356	884	492
	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Uhuru Kenyatta		
	Full Sample	5 day bandwidth	3 day bandwidth
Post Rally	9.55^{***}	7.55^{***}	7.08^{***}
	(1.73)	(2.03)	(2.62)
Constant	75.35	77.14	76.41
	(0.79)	(1.04)	(1.46)
Observations	1,357	884	492

Notes: Estimated complier average causal effects (CACEs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers. Complier effects are calculated by using the post-rally indicator variable as an instrument for awareness of the rally. Results reported are from two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. Standard errors (SEs) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, †p<0.1.

A concern that may emerge from the preceding analyses is that the intention-to-treat (ITT) approach we adopt also includes survey respondents who reported having no knowledge of the opposition rally in the analyses. Although the ITT approach still provides us with valid estimates of the average treatment effect, since we are interested in how presidential candidate evaluations in Uasin Gishu changed in response to Odinga's rally, the inclusion of these non-compliers may prevent us from estimating the quantity of interest to us. We therefore conduct additional analyses to estimate the effect of the opposition rally on the subsample of "compliers," or respondents who reported having knowledge that the rally was held.

We specifically estimate the complier average causal effects (CACEs) using the standard instrumental variables approach in which we use the *assignment to treatment* status – the post-rally indicator – as an instrument for *actual treatment receipt* – a dummy variable that denotes whether a respondent was aware of the rally. Results from the 2SLS regression are reported in Table 4. The results are consistent with our main findings: Odinga's rally had a negative effect on his own feeling thermometer ratings and a positive effect on Kenyatta's ratings. As expected, however, the CACEs reported are larger in magnitude than the ITT effects reported in Figure 3 by around 10–20%, meaning that the inclusion of noncompliers in the ITT analyses did dilute the estimated impact of the rally.

5.2 Why Does an Outgroup Candidate's Rally Backfire?

We have argued that outgroup candidate rallies in non-coethnic constituencies are likely to trigger voter perceptions of inter-group differentiation. Here, we subject this expectation to a series of empirical tests that examine whether a mechanism associated with increased ethnic identification is borne out by our data. If the expectations of social identification and ethnic heuristics are correct, we should find that voters in the post-rally sample are, first, more likely to support the candidate perceived to represent their ingroup, and, second, more likely to identify themselves in ethnic terms. Since Odinga's rally occurred *several months into the campaign period*, and only about a fortnight from the election, there are few other possibilities to account for an abrupt change in patterns of self-identification among local voters.

In Figure 4, we present results from subgroup analyses that test our first observable implication. We disaggregate the effect of Odinga's rally based on respondents' self-identified ethnicity. If our expectation regarding ethnicity's salience is correct, we should observe that the rally induced respondents to evaluate more favorably the candidate considered to represent their ethnic group, while assessing more unfavorably the candidate thought to represent an outgroup. We expect the rally to have decreased Odinga's support among Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters, and increased his support among his coethnic Luos and the other major ethnic group (Luhya) aligned with his electoral coalition. Similarly, we expect increased support for Kenyatta among Kikuyus and Kalenjins, and

Figure 4: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations by ethnic group

(a) FT Ratings for Odinga (Outgroup Candidate)　　　(b) FT Ratings for Kenyatta (Ingroup Candidate)

Notes: The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta, disaggregated by ethnic group. The point estimates for the effect of the rally without controls, with respondent level controls are denoted by the circle, and square respectively. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.

decreased support among Luos and Luhyas.

The analyses in Figure 4 corroborate these expectations. We find a large post-rally decrease in Odinga's feeling thermometer ratings among Kalenjin and Kikuyu respondents, the political ingroups in Uasin Gishu. For Kalenjin respondents, the change represents around a 9–10 point reduction. The decrease among Kikuyus is larger at around 14–15 points. These effects are statistically significant at $p<0.01$. By contrast, the rally consolidated Odinga's support among his coethnic Luos. Odinga's feeling thermometer increased by around 20 points in the post-rally sample, statistically significant at $p<0.01$, despite the limited number of Luo respondents in the sample. The coefficient for Luhyas, who are part of Odinga's electoral coalition, is positive, but the effect fails to obtain statistical significance.

Odinga's rally led to a 6–8 point increase in Kenyatta's feeling thermometer ratings among Kalenjin and Kikuyu respondents. This increase is statistically significant at conventional levels. The effect of the rally on Kenyatta's evaluations among Luos and Luhyas, by contrast, are negative. For Odinga's

coethnic Luos, the rally led to a 14 point decrease in their feeling thermometer ratings for Kenyatta. While this change is substantively large, the drop is only marginally significant at $p<0.1$, and loses significance when respondent-level covariates are included. For Luhyas, the effects are negative, albeit not statistically distinguishable from zero.[21]

Table 5 provides further evidence that the rally increased ethnic salience. We use a dichotomous indicator based on the five-point ordinal variable for ethnic versus national identification. The indicator takes the value of 1 when a respondent reports that they identify only with Kenyan nationality; 0 otherwise. We prefer this dichotomous measure because social desirability bias in Kenya should be expected to push respondents to under-report the extent to which they identify with their ethnic groups. In the full sample, more than 47% of respondents report only identifying as Kenyan and not at all with their ethnic group.[22] With such a large proportion of individuals claiming that they only view themselves in national terms, the best way to capture any changes away from national identification is by examining the *decrease* in the proportion of individuals who identify exclusively as Kenyans.

Employing this dichotomous measure of national identification as our outcome, we conduct the same pre-and-post rally sample comparisons. The results show that individuals surveyed after Odinga's rally are around eight percentage points less likely to identify exclusively as Kenyans and, conversely, eight percentage points more likely to identify at least partially in ethnic terms. While disaggregating the sample into ethnic groups reduces statistical power, we still observe large and substantively important movement towards greater ethnic identification among Kalenjin respondents with a seven-point reduction, significant at the $p<0.05$ level. Overall, these additional tests add confidence to our conclusion that Odinga's rally backfired, depressing his support among non-coethnics voters after the rally.

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[21]We conducted the same analysis (disaggregated by ethnic group) on the alternative operationalization of our outcome. The findings are presented in SI Appendix Table I1. The results remain substantively unchanged.

[22]The ethnic patterns of identification in Table 5 are in line with our findings from six rounds of Afrobarometer surveys (see SI Appendix Section J).

Table 5: Increase in ethnic identification by ethnic group

| | National versus ethnic identification | | | | |
| | "Identify only as a Kenyan" | | | | |
	Full Sample (1)	Kalenjins (2)	Kikuyus (3)	Luos (4)	Luhyas (5)
Post Rally	−0.08***	−0.09**	−0.06	0.02	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.08)
Constant	0.50	0.48	0.72	0.43	0.50
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.15)
Observations	1,356	875	153	51	203

Notes: Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on respondent national/ethnic identification. The national/ethnic identification item was modeled after the Afrobarometer surveys, wherein respondents are asked, whether they identify i) exclusively on ethnic terms, ii) more on ethnic terms than national terms, iii) equally on ethnic and national terms, iv) more on national than ethnic terms, and v) exclusively on national terms. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, †p<0.1.

6   Threats to Inference and Alternative Explanations

We presented in Section 4 an argument and some empirical tests to verify that our approach meets the identifying assumptions required to estimate the effect of the cross-ethnic campaign rally (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020). In this section, we address additional concerns regarding potential threats to inference and alternative explanations.

6.1   Simultaneous and Collateral Events

One concern for inference is that other unrelated events, rather than the rally, affected candidate evaluation. Although we cannot provide conclusive evidence against this possibility, two observations assuage this concern. First, as part of the survey's implementation, survey enumerators were instructed to report back on all unusual political or campaign activities as they undertook the random walk survey protocol. Referencing communication logs with the enumerator team, we find no evidence of increased campaign activity that coincided with Odinga's rally and would have thus affected our main outcomes. Second, to account for the possibility that national events affected candi-

date evaluations in Uasin Gishu, we conducted a comprehensive news search of three major national newspapers (The Nation, The Standard, and The Star) as well as the online social media accounts (Twitter and Facebook) of the presidential coalitions and their constituent parties. We were unable to detect any unusual activity that would induce such a large shift in support for Odinga and Kenyatta in Uasin Gishu.[23]

Additionally, there might be concern that voter shifts are not due to the rally itself, but rather to a series of counter-reactions triggered by the rally. This would entail the mobilization of a counter-campaign by Jubilee party activists responding to Odinga's foray into Uasin Gishu. We provide two observations against this interpretation of our findings. First, as noted above, our enumerators sent hourly reports on any unexpected political activity in their designated survey areas. None reported any counter-campaign activity in their respective enumeration areas in the days following the rally. Second, we report in the SI Appendix K, Figure L1 an analysis of a rally held by the Jubilee Party in the neighboring county of Trans Nzoia, a "swing" county that is dominated by Luhyas, a group not ethnically connected to any of the leading candidates in the Jubilee (Kikuyu/Kalenjin) or NASA (Luo/Kamba) tickets. In this case, we find that Kenyatta's rally resulted in a small positive effect in his support, which is what the rally was intended to produce. If one candidate's rally would typically trigger a counter-mobilization by the other's party, we find no such evidence in Trans Nzoia. And there is no reason to expect that a counter-mobilization effort would have such dramatic effects in Uasin Gishu and not in Trans Nzoia.

To further corroborate the fact that the effects we observe a uniquely attributable to the rally itself, we conduct a series of robustness checks in which we employ placebo treatments, i.e., recode the date of the rally to each day of the survey enumeration period. The results are reported in the SI Appendix Figure K1. The placebo treatments are not able to pick up the effect of the rally, suggesting that neither the cancellation of the initially scheduled rally nor events occurring prior to the actual rally are causes in the shift in candidate evaluation.[24]

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[23]Articles were accessed through Allafrica.com and newspaper websites.

[24]A more detailed discussion of these results accompanies Figure K1 in the SI Appendix.

6.2   Endogenous Timing of Rally

Since Odinga's rally took place while our survey was already in the field for an unrelated project, the timing of the rally was exogenous to our survey schedule. Here, we provide additional evidence suggesting that voter engagement and interest across Kenya was triggered by the rally. Figure 5 plots the count of Google web and Youtube searches for the term "NASA Eldoret" during the entire fieldwork period of our locally-representative survey. The red lines and points represent searches in Youtube (`www.youtube.com`), and the blue lines and points web searches in Google (`www.google.com`).[25]

Figure 5: Rally-related searches using Google Trends data from Kenya

The search trends provide partial corroboration for our claim that the original rally scheduling/cancellation (21 July) as well as the subsequent occurrence of the rally (to 26 July) were unexpected events. Across the entire survey period, the largest spike in web (Google) searches happens on 26 July, the day of the rally. A small number of searches preceded the rally – likely attributable to the rally being cancelled on 21 July and the ensuing press coverage of the cancellation. Youtube search trends follow a similar pattern, albeit with a slight (one day) delay in the spike. This delay is reasonable given that much of the national news coverage, especially television, occurred on the day following the rally (27 July).

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[25]We do not have sufficient data to disaggregate down to Uasin Gishu.

6.3 Robustness to Unobserved Confounding

Figure 6: Coefficient stability to unobserved counfounding

Despite the resilience of the rally effects to potential *observed* confounders, one might still be concerned that our results are driven by selection on *unobservables*. To alleviate this concern, we employ a coefficient stability-based sensitivity analysis proposed by Oster (2017) to estimate the level of unobserved confounding that would lead us to mistakenly detect a statistically significant effect when the true average treatment effect is zero. This analysis takes as an input the R^2 of a hypothetical linear regression on our outcome that includes our treatment variable (post-rally), observables (age, gender, vote in previous election, secondary education, asset ownership, religion, and ethnicity), and unobservables. For each value of R^2, we calculate the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that could be driving our estimate, given that the true effect for the rally is zero.

The results of these analyses are presented in Figure 6. The blue line shows that – for R^2 values between 0.3 and 0.7 needed to mistakenly detect an 8.16 point decrease on Odinga's feeling thermometer as a result of the rally when the true effect is zero – individuals would need to be selecting into

the post-rally sample (treatment) on the basis of unobserved attributes that are 1.6 times to 13 times more influential than the combined effect of observables. Similarly, the red line shows that for the same R^2 range the unobserved attributes that drove selection into treatment should be 1.5 times to 19 times stronger than the observables driving selection if we were to spuriously detect a 5.47 point increase on Kenyatta's feeling thermometer when the true effect is zero. Given the set of observables we include in the analysis, we conclude that the omission of an unobservable of such importance is unrealistic. It is only when we assume extreme R^2 values of 0.97 and 0.92 for Odinga and Kenyatta, respectively, that unobservables that are equally important vis-à-vis observables in driving selection into treatment could lead us to mistakenly detect statistically significant effects when the true effects are zero. We find such extreme values of R^2 highly unlikely given the existence of measurement error and idiosyncratic variation in survey outcomes.

7   Conclusion

Our findings suggest there are limits to cross-ethnic persuasion of voters in societies characterized by ethnic polarization. We show that attempts at cross-cleavage outreach may reinforce perceptions of zero-sum inter-group competition in polarized societies. These findings call for more research on how voters respond to electoral rules meant to foster cross-identity political mobilization. How do elite incentives for cross-identity alliance building interact with voters' micro-level electoral behavior predicated on zero-sum inter-group competition and reinforced by historical experience? How does institutional design impact party development among voters in deeply divided societies? And under what conditions can elite cues result in voters' support for non-coethnics?

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Supporting Information (SI)

Do Voters Respond to Cross-Ethnic Campaigning in Divided Societies?

Table of Contents

A The Political Context in Kenya

Kenya's current electoral rules were adopted with the express purpose of engineering cross-ethnic political mobilization.[1] The constitution has both a majority rule and distributional requirement. The winning presidential candidate must garner at least 50 percent plus one of the valid votes cast, and get at least 25 percent of the votes in at least half of the 47 counties.

Therefore, the electoral rules create strong incentives for presidential candidates to reach out to ethnic outgroups. While ethnicity remains to be an important principle of organizing politics in the country, no single ethnic group has the capacity to win elections outright. The five largest ethnic groups are Kikuyu (17.7 percent), Luhya (14.2 percent), Kalenjin (13.3 percent), Luo (10.8 percent), and Kamba (10.4 percent). Since independence Kenya has had three Kikuyu presidents and one Kalenjin president. All four administrations have been characterized by ethnic discrimination in the provision of public goods and services, access to public sector jobs, and general oppression of perceived oppositionist ethnic groups. This experience is colloquially described in Kenya has part of "historical injustices" committed by successive administrations.[2] Following the reintroduction of multiparty electoral politics in 1992, all elections have been marked by electoral violence and high levels of ethic voting – especially among the biggest ethnic groups.

The current electoral rules requiring cross-ethnic political mobilization and outreach were adopted in the aftermath of widespread violence in parts of the country following a disputed election in 2007. The goal of the majority rule was to encourage to form nationally competitive parties by campaigning among ethnic outgroups. And it appears to have worked. In both 2013 and 2017 Kenyan presidential elections were dominated by two leading coalitions – one headed by Raila Odinga (CORD then NASA) and the other by Kenyatta (Jubilee). CORD and later NASA were dominated by Luo, Luhya, and Kamba elites and their constituents. The formateurs of the Jubilee coalition were Kalenjin and Kikuyu elites.

For both coalitions, the dominant groups could not on their own satisfy both the majority rule (50 percent plus one) and the distributional requirement (at least 25 percent in at least 24 counties) stipulated in the constitution. Therefore, the respective presidential candidates had to campaign among ethnic outgroups.

It is in this context that Raila Odinga headlined NASA's campaign rally on July 26, 2017 in Eldoret's 64 Stadium in Uasin Gishu county, a majority Kalenjin county and a jubilee stronghold. The rally was an explicit attempt by NASA to woo Kalenjin voters to support its presidential candidate. While Odinga may not have been able to win the county, campaigning among ethnic outgroups in Uasin Gishu could add to his total tally of votes, as well as give him more cushion with regard to the constitution's distributional requirement (he eventually missed the 25 percent threshold by just over 3 percentage points). In this quest, the party highlighted traditional economic messages – especially focusing on agriculture and Jubilee's alleged neglect of the sector, since Uasin Gishu is the main maize producing region of Kenya.[3]

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[1]See Ndegwa, Stephen N. 1998. "The Incomplete Transition: The Constitutional and Electoral Context in Kenya," *Africa Today*, Vol. 45, No. 2 pp. 193-211; and Kenya Human Rights Commission (2018): Ethnicity and Politicization in Kenya: `https://short1.link/HYrBGs`

[2]Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission (2018), Towards National Cohesion and Unity in Kenya: Ethnic Diversity and Audit of the Civil Service. Accessed on February 10, 2019: `https://bit.ly/2WVQ1P8`. See also Ajulu, Rok. 2002. Politicised ethnicity, competitive politics and conflict in Kenya: A his-torical perspective. *African Studies* 61(2):251268

[3]Rutto, Stephen. 2017. "Raila Woos Ruto's North Rift Backyard, Says Maize Shortage Shows Jubilee Failure," *The Star*,

Overall, NASA's rally is an important example of how institutions and electoral rules can condition the behavior of politicians and parties in ethnically polarized societies. However, it is also a cautionary tale on the limits of institutional design as a mechanism of ameliorating the negative effects of political ethnicity. Ultimately, the attempt to reach out to an outgroup electorate backfired by activating identity-based categorization and evaluation of politicians among voters.

B Research Ethics

This paper examines a much-studied feature of Kenyan politics. However, we acknowledge that political ethnicity and ethnic polarization have often resulted in violence and destruction, especially around elections. Our study took care to assure each individual participant that they were at liberty to stop responding to questions at any point in the survey.

Our enumerators obtained participants' informed consent by reading out loud a consent request, either in English or Swahili (Kenya's two national languages). Enumerators presented a consented document to potential respondents to ascertain eligibility (18-years or older) and consent (verbal agreement). Participating respondents were given copies of consent forms with contact information for the research teams. The consent request included a summary of the purpose of our study, procedure, time commitment, benefits, potential risks or discomforts with survey questions, confidentiality, compensation (50s shillings of airtime), participants rights, the researchers involved, and our contact information. Prior to deployment, we recruited and trained our enumerators on how to elicit consent from respondents. One co-author was in the field during the implementation of the survey, and worked with a supervisor to ensure that our enumerators stuck to the protocols established. We held daily briefing sessions in the mornings before enumerators were dispatched.

There was no deception involved in this study. We primed voters with publicly available information on the performance of their county government. The survey instrument had two main parts. Part I presented respondents with questions on basic demographics, public issues, political party preferences, and candidate preferences. The "Treatment Script" was considered experimental because respondents were randomly selected to hear different versions of the following dimensions: (a) whether the allocated funds are based on a formula or political negotiation; (b) whether allocated funds for development projects met legal thresholds (good news) or allocated funds for development were not fully spent (bad news) or no news about how those funds were spent; and (c) the name of the county governor, his political party and which presidential candidate he/she supports. After completing Part I of the survey, respondents were asked to watch a three-minute video on the electronic tablets about the state of their county's use of public funds. Respondents were given the option not to watch the video. In the video, a narrator's voice read a "Treatment Script." The script described the role of county governments in managing funds for public services under the new Kenyan constitution as well as how the county's current government has allocated funds.

All information presented in the video was factual and publicly available. The information on county funds was from official government audit reports. The names and party affiliations of county governors were publicly available. Respondents saw images in the video that corresponded to the text in the "Treatment Script," including figures for the funds used in their county and a photo of their county governor. At the end of each survey, participants were given 50 shillings worth of phone

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July 26, 2017. Accessed on February 4, 2019: `https://bit.ly/2TCK6ME`

airtime (approx. $0.50) as an appreciation of their time. The participant pool was diverse, was largely representative of the ethnic composition of Uasin Gishu county.

The outcomes of interest in this paper were measured prior to the implementation of the experimental intervention in our original study.

Our study did not have any bearing on actual political outcomes. We focused on the gubernatorial race Uasin Gishu, in which the incumbent had garnered 74.8% of the vote share in the 2013 election and was running for reelection. We provided respondents with publicly available information as a prime, and our sample size of 1,400 was not large enough to sway the electoral outcome. We asked questions that were not designed to instigate cross-ethnic antagonism in Uasin Gishu county. Questions about ethnicity, partisan affiliation, and intended vote choice are common in survey work in Kenya, and have not been known to cause harm to respondents. Similar surveys have been conducted throughout Kenya, in both ethnically homogeneous and diverse contexts. Our original study in Uasin Gishu was designed to study attribution and accountability under devolved government in Kenya, and included fact-based questions about the performance of county governors. The study targeted adults of voting age (over 18) and did not include any vulnerable populations or ask questions that would introduce or expose participants' vulnerability. Our chosen sampling protocol did not disadvantage any groups in Uasin Gishu. Finally, in addition to our own attention to research ethics, our study was formally approved by a university Institutional Review Board and the Government of Kenya's National Commission For Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI).

C   Survey Fieldwork Methodology

NASA's rally in Uasin Gishu coincided with our pre-planned and unrelated field survey of voters in the county. The original rally was scheduled to take place before our survey went live in the field, but had to be suspended twice following the death of senior politicians in the region.[1] The rally is, therefore, a plausible natural experiment that allows us to identify the effect of a campaign rally by an outgroup politician in an opponent's (geographic) stronghold.

A distinct advantage of our study over other works that use a similar identification strategy is that we have complete information regarding how the survey was conducted in Uasin Gishu county. Our survey is locally representative in the county. Many nationally-representative surveys follow a sampling and data collection strategy is geographically clustered; where enumerators and enumeration teams concentrate on collecting data from one geographical unit (say a constituency) at a time and only proceeds to the next geographical unit once the quota for the first unit has been met. This can pose a significant threat to inference if, for example, geographic units sampled before and after an event (in our case, the rally) systematically differ on a variety of characteristics, both observed and unobserved.

We argue that the fact that our survey is a locally representative county level survey, rather than a national survey, certainly decreases the potential that there is significant heterogeneity in the sample composition on multiple covariates based on fieldwork schedule. But in order to mitigate these concerns even further, we deliberately adopted a survey sampling/data collection approach made sure that our enumeration team, comprised of 12 enumerators, *simultaneously* engaged in data collection across different sampling areas dispersed across multiple geographic units (in our case the

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[1]Ndanyi, Matthew. 2017. "NASA cancels Rift Valley rallies to mourn Biwott, Bethuel Kiplagat," *The Star*, July 22, 2017. Accessed on February 10, 2019: `https://bit.ly/2GBZ55F`

Figure C1: Map of Uasin Gishu county and sampled geographic units

constituency). At any given time throughout the data collection period, enumerators were spread across at least three (and often more than 3) different constituencies. Within their assigned sampling areas, an enumerators were instructed to identify a specific sampling point and then administer a random-walk household sampling protocol modeled off the Afrobarometer surveys. The design of the survey methodology mitigates concern that by comparing the pre-and post-rally samples, we are not comparing geographic units that are systematically different on observable and unobservable characteristics (as the balance tests conducted on the pre and post samples, reported in Table 3 demonstrate). Overall, we have no reason to believe that there are any systematic patterns in the field implementation of the survey that could challenge our research design.

D   Rally-related statistics

Rally awareness and attendance by ethnic group

Table D1 presents the proportion of survey respondents who reported they had i) knowledge of the rally being held, ii) personally attended the rally, or iii) an acquaintance attend the rally, broken down by the respondent's ethnic group. Although the differences in the proportion of individuals who had knowledge of the rally being held are relatively slight, the proportion of individuals who report having attended the rally differ significantly across ethnic groups; whereas 45% of ethnic Luos (coethnics of Raila Odinga) report having attended the rally, a mere 13% and 8% of respondents who identified as Kalenjin and Kikuyu (ethnic coalition behind Uhuru Kenyatta) said they attended.

Table D1: Rally-related statistics by ethnic group

	Kalenjin	Kikuyu	Luo	Luhya
Knowledge of rally	81.4%	91.4%	100.0%	77.5%
Personally attended rally	13.1%	8.9%	45.5%	22.4%
Acquaintance attended rally	26.8%	30.4%	81.8%	40.8%

These figures add confidence to an important assumption in our empirical set up: that a sizable majority of residents of Uasin Gishu were broadly aware of the campaign rally and the presence of an outgroup presidential candidate in their county – in the person of Raila Odinga. It is also clear from the Table D1 that attendance of the rally was strongly correlated with co-ethnicity with elites in the opposition NASA coalition. Only 13.9 percent and 2.2 percent of Kalanjins and Kikuyus, respectively, attended the rally; compared to 45.5 and 22.4 percent of Luos and Luhyas surveyed.

Correlates of rally awareness and attendance

Table D2 reports findings from regression analyses that probe the correlates of rally awareness and attendance. Controlling for a host of respondent-level covariates, respondents from the Luo group are 26.3% points more likely to have personally attended the rally, and 41.3% points more likely to have a personal acquaintance attend. Such differences in ethnic group membership are, again, not observed for awareness of the rally. In other words, the rally was broadly known to have taken place independent of ethnic identity – here proxied by being Luo or Luhya, the major co-ethnics of leading elites in NASA. Access to media in the form of a TV and having had some secondary education are positively correlated with rally awareness, suggesting that most respondents learned of the rally through the mass media – especially television and newspapers. Ownership of a radio (which is widespread among most Kenyan households) is not statistically correlated with awareness of the NASA rally.

The broad awareness of the rally is also an indicator of the importance of political rallies in African electoral campaigns; and adds credence to our claim of the importance of interrogating the effects of these forms of outreach to voters. In Kenya and across much of Africa, mass rallies are an important way to reach voters – often providing politicians with opportunities to showcase their ability to provide clientelistic benefits, such as through the distribution of material benefits (e.g. t-shirts, *chitenge*, foodstuffs).[1]

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[1]See, for example, Worden, Sarah. 2014. "Chitenje: The Production and Use of Printed Cotton Cloth in Malawi," *Textile Society of America Symposium Proceedings*. Available here: `https://bit.ly/2th0qXV`; and Guardado, Jenny and Leonard Wantchekon. 2017. "Do electoral handouts affect voting behavior?" *Afrobarometer Working Paper, No. 171*. Available here: `https://bit.ly/2GGWibL`

Table D2: Correlates of rally awareness and attendance

	Awareness of rally	Personally attended	Acquaint. attended
Ethnic Luo	0.058	0.263	0.413
	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.135)
Ethnic Luhya	−0.064	0.100	0.107
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.067)
Age	−0.006	0.0001	−0.006
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Prior turnout	0.064	−0.019	0.019
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.054)
Secondary education	0.167	0.097	0.036
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.072)
Protestant	−0.005	0.004	0.061
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.046)
Owns radio	0.101	0.055	0.089
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.080)
Owns TV	0.097	0.071	0.137
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.055)
Owns motor vehicle	−0.001	−0.003	−0.055
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.054)
Owns mobile phone	0.100	−0.056	−0.046
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.081)
Owns bicycle	0.032	0.113	0.186
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.047)
Constant	0.609	−0.035	0.215
	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.139)
Observations	421	421	421
R^2	0.181	0.084	0.141

[a] *Notes:* Robust standard errors (SEs) from linear regression analysis in parentheses.

E   The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer ratings

In this section we show results from estimates of voters' evaluations of presidential candidates after exposure to the rally in different bandwidths. We show the results in Table E1. The results in Table E1 were used to generate Figure 3. Regardless of the choice of bandwidth (full sample, vs 5 days, vs 3 days), NASA's campaign rally in Uasin Gishu appears to have had a statistically significant and consistently negative impact on Odinga's candidate feeling thermometer ratings. Conversely, the rally seems to have had a statistically significant positive impact on Kenyatta's candidate feeling thermometer ratings regardless of bandwidth selection. These findings further reinforce our confidence in the stability of the effect of NASA's rally.

Table E1: Effect of rally on evaluations of presidential candidates

	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Raila Odinga (outgroup candidate)								
Panel A.	Full Sample			5 Day Bandwidth			3 Day Bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	−10.48	−10.31	−7.87	−9.41	−9.15	−8.65	−9.47	−8.93	−7.50
	(1.73)	(1.74)	(1.54)	(2.05)	(2.09)	(1.83)	(2.74)	(2.77)	(2.39)
Constant	45.39	45.74	31.41	44.36	48.80	35.52	44.91	52.53	34.74
	(0.97)	(3.96)	(4.11)	(1.30)	(5.15)	(5.35)	(1.83)	(7.00)	(7.07)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,356	1,352	1,352	884	880	880	492	490	490
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.26	0.02	0.04	0.28	0.02	0.04	0.31

|	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Uhuru Kenyatta (ingroup candidate)								
Panel B.	Full Sample			5 Day Bandwidth			3 Day Bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	7.86	7.37	5.37	6.12	5.43	4.90	5.92	5.25	4.29
	(1.41)	(1.43)	(1.24)	(1.64)	(1.66)	(1.44)	(2.18)	(2.17)	(1.86)
Constant	75.35	72.87	82.18	77.14	73.59	83.31	76.41	66.78	83.31
	(0.79)	(3.24)	(3.31)	(1.03)	(4.10)	(4.21)	(1.46)	(5.49)	(5.51)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,357	1,353	1,353	884	880	880	492	490	490
R^2	0.02	0.04	0.28	0.02	0.04	0.29	0.01	0.07	0.34

[a] *Notes:* Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Respondent-level covariates included in some specifications are respondent age, vote in the previous election, secondary education, religion, and the asset ownership index. For ethnicity fixed effects, we take responses from the self-reported measure of ethnic group membership from a list of 15 groups. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

F The effect of the opposition rally on alternative outcomes

In this section we employ different operationalizations of the effect of the campaign rally on the evaluations of the two leading presidential candidates – incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga. We also show point estimates of the effects of the campaign rally using different bandwidths (full sample, vs 5 days, vs 3 days).

The regression analyses and graphical presentation indicate that Odinga's rally effectively "backfired" as a form of cross-ethnic campaign outreach, resulting in a decidedly negative shift in voter evaluations for the outgroup candidate. Instead, the rally moved voter opinion in favor of the ingroup candidate. To facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of these findings, we present in Figure F1 the difference in the proportion of individuals who had a *positive* evaluation of Odinga and Kenyatta, a score of 50 or above in their respective feeling thermometers, across the pre-and post-rally samples.[1]

Figure F1: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations (binary indicator)

(a) Proportion of Positive Evaluations: Odinga   (b) Proportion of Positive Evaluations: Kenyatta

Notes: To generate the outcomes for subplots (a) and (b), we recode the feeling thermometer ratings for each candidate into a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when a survey respondents gives a rating of 50 or more; it is 0 otherwise. These differences were calculated based on the full sample of survey respondents. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, †p<0.1

As subfigure (a) shows, around 35% of voters had a positive evaluation of Odinga in the pre-rally sample. This relatively low proportion of positive evaluations is expected, since Uasin Gishu is a stronghold of the ingroup presidential ticket. In the post-rally sample, however, the proportion of respondents with a positive evaluation drops even further to 22%. This represents a 33% decrease, statistically significant at p<0.01. Subfigure (b) shows the change in the proportion of respondents

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[1]We present the same analysis on alternative operationalization of our outcomes in SI Appendix Table F1. Our main findings hold when we employ these alternative operationalizations.

with a positive evaluation of Kenyatta. In the pre-rally sample, the proportion of respondents with favorable views of Kenyatta was 80%. Despite this high baseline rate, the proportion still rose to 88% in the post-rally sample, a statistically significant increase. This is remarkable, given that the rally took place after months of national campaigning and a time when the standard generalized increase in the salience of ethnicity (a la Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010)) should have already been baked in.

Outcome: Evaluation gap between Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga

Next, we operationalize the outcome variable as the gap in respondents' evaluation of incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition candidate Raila Odinga. We then estimate the effect of NASA's campaign rally using different bandwidths (i.e. the full sample, 5 days, and 3 days). We show the results in Table F1. Regardless of the bandwidth selection, the campaign rally appears to have had a consistent positive effect in the gap between the evaluations of Kenyatta and Odinga in the candidate feeling thermometer ratings. The gap in the ratings of Kenyatta and Odinga are robust to the inclusion of covariates as controls and ethnicity fixed effects.

Table F1: Effect of rally on evaluations of presidential candidates

	Evaluation Gap between Kenyatta and Odinga (FT Kenyatta FT Odinga)								
	Full Sample			5 day bandwidth			3 day bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	18.29	17.62	13.22	15.55	14.58	13.55	15.39	14.18	11.79
	(2.72)	(2.75)	(2.29)	(3.22)	(3.28)	(2.72)	(4.36)	(4.37)	(3.56)
Constant	30.03	27.20	50.91	32.81	24.91	47.91	31.50	14.25	48.57
	(1.52)	(6.24)	(6.10)	(2.04)	(8.09)	(7.93)	(2.91)	(11.05)	(10.54)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,354	1,350	1,350	883	879	879	492	490	490
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.35	0.03	0.04	0.36	0.02	0.06	0.40

[a] *Notes:* Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Respondent-level covariates included in some specifications are respondent age, vote in the previous election, secondary education, religion, and the asset ownership index. For ethnicity fixed effects, we take responses from the self-reported measure of ethnic group membership. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

G   Effect of opposition rally on down-ballot candidates

Kenya's 2017 General Election included gubernatorial elections. In Uasin Gishu county, incumbent governor Jackson Mandago – allied to Kenyatta's Jubilee coalition – was up for reelection against challenger Zedekiah Kiprop Bundotich, an independent candidate. We estimate the rally's effect on the candidate feeling thermometer ratings of Jackson Mandago (incumbent) using different bandwidths (full sample, 5 days, and 3 days).

Pooled effects

Table H1: Effect of rally on down-ballot candidates (gubernatorial)

| | Feeling thermometer for incumbent governor Jackson Mandago) | | | | | | | | |
| | Full Sample | | | 5 day bandwidth | | | 3 day bandwidth | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	6.99	6.95	5.94	6.18	6.04	5.44	2.00	2.04	0.61
	(1.86)	(1.88)	(1.72)	(2.19)	(2.23)	(2.07)	(2.90)	(2.90)	(2.68)
Constant	61.34	55.35	29.82	63.45	52.60	30.65	64.85	49.70	39.69
	(1.04)	(4.28)	(4.58)	(1.39)	(5.49)	(6.04)	(1.93)	(7.32)	(7.95)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,357	1,353	1,353	883	879	879	493	491	491
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.20	0.01	0.03	0.18	0.001	0.04	0.21

[a]   *Notes:* Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for the incumbent governor Jackson Mandago, who was the gubernatorial candidate for the incumbent Jubilee party. Respondent-level covariates included in some specifications are respondent age, vote in the previous election, secondary education, religion, and the asset ownership index. For ethnicity fixed effects, we take responses from the self-reported measure of ethnic group membership. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

Table H1 shows results for the pooled sample using different bandwidths. We find that NASA's rally had a positive and statistically significant effect on the ratings of Governor Mandago in the full sample and the sample that includes a bandwidth of 5 days. However, using a 3 day bandwidth, we find that the effect of the rally on Mandago's rating is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The findings in columns 1-6 are robust to the inclusion of covariates as controls and ethnicity fixed effects. The failure to detect any effects within the 3 day window might suggest that NASA's rally was initially primarily viewed in terms of the presidential election (NASA had no viable candidate in the gubernatorial race).

H Robustness check: Matching analysis

In addition to the regression-based analysis presented, we conduct robustness checks of the findings using Genetic Matching, developed by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).[1] In line with the approach employed in the regression analyses, we match on individual covariates (respondent age, prior turnout, secondary education, and the asset ownership index). We also match *exactly* on the self-reported religion and ethnicity of the respondent. Although pre and post matching balance statistics are not reported, the matching procedure successfully corrects the minor covariate imbalances in pre and post-rally samples.

Table H1: Effect of rally, Genetic Matching

	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Raila Odinga		
	Full Sample	5 Day Bandwidth	3 Day Bandwidth
Estimate (ATT)	−10.584	−8.495	−7.382
AI SE	(1.970)	(2.438)	(2.912)
P-Value	p<0.001	p<0.001	p=0.011
Observations	920	637	333
	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Uhuru Kenyatta		
	Full Sample	5 Day Bandwidth	3 Day Bandwidth
Estimate (ATT)	5.9358	4.0186	5.473
AI SE	(1.408)	(1.776)	(2.088)
P-Value	p<0.001	p=0.023	p=0.009
Observations	920	637	333

[a] *Notes:* Estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) from matching analysis of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Matching was conducted using the R package `Matching` developed by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). Abadie-Imbens standard errors (SEs) which account for the asymptotic variance induced by the matching procedure reported in parentheses.

The findings from the matching analysis strongly corroborate the regression analyses. In the full sample, the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the rally is around -10 points for Raila Odinga's feeling thermometer rating, which is statistically significant at p <0.001. As we narrow the bandwidth to 5 and 3 days before and after the rally, the ATTs decrease marginally, but retain their statistical significance at conventional levels. Similar patterns are observed for the ATTs for evaluations of Uhuru Kenyatta, which oscillates between 4 and 6 points depending on the sample analyzed.

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[1]The matching procedure was implemented using the R package `Matching`.

I Alternative tests of the mechanism

In this section we dig deeper into the analysis of the rally's impact on respondents' evaluation gap between Kenyatta and Odinga, again disaggregated by ethnic group.

Outcome 1: Evaluation gap between Kenyatta and Odinga, by ethnic group

Table I1: Effect of rally on evaluation gap between Kenyatta and Odinga, disaggregated by ethnic group

	Evaluation Gap between Kenyatta and Odinga (FT Kenyatta – FT Odinga)							
	Kalenjins		Kikuyus		Luos		Luhya	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post Rally	18.05	17.35	18.30	19.28	−34.90	−28.21	−7.96	−6.14
	(2.53)	(2.54)	(5.61)	(5.64)	(10.52)	(10.79)	(8.44)	(8.71)
Constant	42.57	36.19	49.38	49.31	−26.92	−2.79	−7.55	10.51
	(1.46)	(6.60)	(3.40)	(15.35)	(4.94)	(19.65)	(4.14)	(15.51)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	873	870	153	153	50	50	204	203
R^2	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.19	0.34	0.004	0.04

[a] *Notes:* Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta, disaggregated by ethnic group of respondent. Respondent ethnic group is coded based on a self-reported ethnic affiliation question included in the survey. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

The results in Table I1 largely conform to the findings above. After the rally, Kalenjins and Kikuyus had, on average, higher levels of ratings for Kenyatta and lower levels of ratings for Odinga. In short, the gap widened. Similarly, for Luos and Luhyas, afer the rally respondents who self-identified as members of these ethnic groups had cosistently higher levels of ratings for Odinga and lower levels for Kenyatta. Like in the examples above, these findings are robust to the inclusion of covariates as controls.

Outcome 2: Party feeling thermometers, by ethnic group

As we noted above, the Kenyan political terrain is marked by a close overlap between ethnicity and party affiliation. In the 2017 election, ethnic Kalenjins and Kikuyus were largely associated with the Jubilee Party; while ethnic Luos and Luhyas were allied with NASA. We have also shown above that an important mechanism through which the rally reduced support for Odinga while boosting the same for Kenyatta was through an increase in the salience of ethnicity. Given the close associated of ethnicity with political affiliation in Kenya, we also posit that the increase in the salience of ethnicity was marked by an increase in perceived affiliation with parties and coalitions associated with co-ethnic presidential candidates and elites. Knowing the Kenyan context, we are confident that party affiliation did not condition ethnicity. The Jubilee Coalition bringing together Kalenjin and Kikuyu

elites was formed in 2013, while the Jubilee Party was formally launched on September 8, 2016.[1]. The National Super Alliance (which grew out of the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy [CORD]) only congealed in December 2016 and was formally launched in January of 2017.

Table I2: Mechanism: Increase in party feeling thermometer by ethnic group

|	Party Feeling Thermometer				
	Full Sample	Kalenjins	Kikuyus	Luos	Luhyas
Post Rally	5.49	6.33	0.77	20.58	−1.19
	(1.09)	(1.21)	(3.49)	(6.17)	(4.45)
Constant	80.26	78.02	68.85	78.27	85.25
	(2.99)	(3.06)	(8.51)	(11.65)	(8.22)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	Yes	-	-	-	-
Observations	975	681	92	37	118

[a] *Notes:* Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on evaluation of the respondent's own political party. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression analysis.

The results in Table I2 show that NASA's rally in Uasin Gishu has the effect of increasing partisan attachment among respondents – measured as the rating of the party in the feeling thermometer. There is a clear difference in the partisanship effects before and after the rally in the full sample. When we disaggregate the sample by ethnicity, we find strong effects among Kalenjins and Luos. The effects among Kikuyus and Luhyas are not statistically distinguishable from zero. These differences in effect sizes may partially be driven by sample sizes and the differential effects of co-ethnicity with candidates at the top of the ticket (Luos and Odinga) or the sense of being the ingroup facing a political event led by an ethnic outgroup (Kalenjins in Uasin Gishu).

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[1]"11 parties fold and merge into Jubilee today " *The Star* September 9, 2016. Accessed on February 10, 2019: `https://bit.ly/2SKFE00`

J Salience of Ethnic Identity

Figure J1: The Salience of Ethnicity Across Time in National Surveys

Notes: Figure shows summaries of respondents who identify as "Kenyan only" across rounds 2 through 7 of the Afro-barometer survey. Solid lines represent national election years (2002, 2007, and 2013. Dotted lines indicate referendums (2005 and 2010). Notice the overall secular increase in the share of respondents identifying as "Only Kenyan" over time.

Our findings are even more remarkable given that the salience of ethnicity was already high during the election cycle. As noted by Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010), across African states, the salience of ethnicity increases around elections. Yet we document an increase in the salience of ethnicity, *despite the already heightened salience of ethnicity during the campaign period*. There is no reason to believe that the rally, which happened merely a fortnight before the election on August 8th, marked the onset of the increase in the salience of ethnicity during the 2017 electoral cycle either in Uasin Gishu county or in Kenya more generally.

Figure J2 shows changing reported perceptions of unfair treatment by the government across multiple ethnic groups, according to data from Rounds 2 through 7 of the Afrobarometer surveys. Notably, perceptions of unfair treatment varies with an ethnic groups representation in the national government.

Figure J2: Ethnicity and Perceptions of Government Discrimination

Notes: Figures show self-reported perceptions of unfair treatment of one's ethnic group by the government and reported primary identity. Perceptions of discrimination and reported primary identity varies with ethnic group elites' roles in the national government.

K   Robustness: Placebo Treatment Analysis

Figure K1: Treatment Effects with Placebo Treatments

Notes: Figures show treatment effects of the opposition rally, using each day of the survey enumeration period as "placebo" treatments (i.e. the day the rally was held) and imposing 3 day rolling bandwidths to estimate differences in evaluations of the outgroup candidate (Raila Odinga) and ingroup candidate (Uhuru Kenyatta) respectively. The point estimates for the effect of the rally with the full set of controls are denoted by the circle. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.

Some might be concerned that other events during the survey enumeration period is driving the findings reported in the main text. For example, it might be the case that the cancellation of the originally scheduled rally, rather than the rally itself, is driving the negative evaluation of the outgroup candidate and the positive evaluation of the ingroup candidate. While this cannot be tested directly, we attempt to probe this possibility by conducting analysis using placebo treatments. This approach basically recodes the "postrally" treatment indicator to each day of the survey enumeration period and conduct pre/post treatment comparisons within a 3 day bandwidth; the intuition is

that we should see that the treatment effects to be most substantively meaningful the day in which the rally was actually held, with little to no observed effects on differences in candidate evaluations pre/post a date in which a rally did not take place. Figure K1 presents the results of these analyses. The upper subfigure are estimate treatment effects by each day of the survey enumeration period with 3 day rolling bandwidths for Raila Odinga (outgroup candidate), and the bottom subfigure for Uhuru Kenyatta (ingroup candidate).

The results in Figure K1 strongly supports the idea that it was the rally itself, rather than other events during the survey enumeration period, that had a substantively meaningful impact on candidate evaluations. First, we observe no treatment effects if the treatment indicator (postrally variable) is set to any days during the days preceding the date in which our rally occurred in real life (day 9), with the exceptions of days 7 and 8, for which the rolling 3 day bandwidth includes respondents that were surveyed after the actual rally occurred (the estimates for day 7 include respondents from day 10, and the estimates for day 8 includes respondents from day 10 and 11, which are observations that fall after the date of the actual rally (day 9)). Note especially that the cancellation of the rally of the initially scheduled on day 4 of the survey enumeration period had no observable effect on candidate evaluations within a 3 day bandwidth window; the coefficient is close to zero and statistically indistinguishable at at the 90/95% level.

Second, the point estimate of the effect of the rally is largest when we make pre/post comparisons centered on the date the actual rally was held (day 9). Once we move the placebo treatments to days following the actual rally (days 10, 11, 12, 13), the effect of the rally decrease in magnitude, as the rolling bandwidth includes what are in reality post rally observations in the *pretreatment* period for the placebo treatments.

L Rally Effects in Trans Nzoia

Figure L1: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations: Trans Nzoia

(a) FT Ratings for Odinga

(b) FT Ratings for Kenyatta

Notes: The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. The point estimates for the effect of the rally without controls, with respondent level controls, and with respondent level controls and ethnicity fixed effects are denoted by the circle, square, and triangle respectively. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.